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1 Introduction
The primary focus of this document is to quantify variables that capture different aspects of contract
characteristics, supply-side factors and institutional details of international mortgage markets. We collect
and describe the data from secondary sources, for the 14 countries in the sample of Badarinza, Campbell,
and Ramadorai (2014).
Prior cross-country studies of mortgage market characteristics (in particular Lea, 2010) describe cross-
country variation in mortgage market characteristics in a predominantly qualitative fashion, and do not
contain the kind of data that is suitable for inclusion in a quantitative empirical study. Our aim is to un-
cover data (from secondary sources) which can accurately capture cross-sectional and time-series variation
in these characteristics.
The principal challenges encountered in this quantification exercise are as follows. First, there is a lack
of availability of comparable variables measuring the aspects of contract characteristics and supply-side
factors that we are interested in, since no entity in the public domain has so far attempted to classify
and assemble such data. Second, since measures of the same (or similar) variables may be obtained from
different sources for different subsets of the sample, inconsistencies may arise in methods used to construct
the relevant variables. An extreme case of this phenomenon is seen in the section on securitization rates,
where the fact that securities issuance and lending volumes have been obtained from different sources
leads to logical inconsistencies in the data. Finally, several sources of data on these characteristics have
limited coverage of the countries in the sample, and/or omit coverage of particular variables at various
points in time.
Table 1 provides an overview of the limitations affecting the data collection exercise. Some aspects
of contract characteristics and supply-side factors were simply not amenable to quantification, and in
these cases, potential proxy variables are discussed. Throughout the tables in this report, cells which are
left blank indicate that data was unavailable, and cells containing a hyphen (-) indicate inappropriate or
logically inconsistent data which has been censored.
2 Contract Characteristics
The variables in this section attempt to capture elements of mortgage contract characteristics that may
affect household mortgage choice. The variables that we attempt to quantify under this category are (1)
regulations governing maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, (2) foreclosure rules, (3) bankruptcy proceed-
ings, and (4) prepayment penalties. Prepayment penalties are of particular interest as we would expect
the presence, absence, and extent of these to have an effect on the choice of fixed-rate (FRM) versus
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM).
In the absence of prepayment penalties on FRMs (especially long-term FRMs), the call option value of
holding an FRM becomes more relevant, as they can be refinanced when rates fall. The call option value
embedded in FRMs represents a cost to lenders, and is likely to have an impact on FRM rates.
Conversely, a stricter prepayment penalty system, might diminish this FRM option value by making
refinancing more costly, or in some cases impossible, potentially making ARMs relatively more attractive.
We report data on each of these aspects of contract characteristics in Tables 3 to 5.
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2.1 Maximum LTV ratios
Data on the maximum LTV ratio have been used by three main strands of the literature. First, the com-
parative studies of mortgage markets across countries, e.g. Mercer Oliver Wyman and EMF (2003), ECB
(2009), IMF (2011), Warnock and Warnock (2008)), tend to report cross-sectional averages but no time-
series dynamics for the maximum LTV ratio.
Second, empirical macroeconomic studies that use maximum LTV ratios as a measure of liquidity
constraints, e.g. Jappelli and Pagano (1989, 1994), Chiuri and Jappelli (2003), Almeida et al. (2006), report
time-series variation in the maximum LTV ratio only on a decade-by-decade basis and their coverage
usually extends only until the 1990s. Official maximum LTV ratios are usually set by regulators for an
extended duration, and are generally speaking not an active policy instrument (except very recently, or in
emerging markets, as we discuss below).
For more recent data, we turn to a third set of studies on the use of maximum LTV ratios and other
financial regulations by central banks as instruments for macro-prudential policy, e.g. Crowe et. al (2011).
In Table 2, we report the maximum LTV ratios for the countries in our sample over a period com-
mencing in 1980, until the most recently available figures. These are obtained from the secondary sources
mentioned above. We have included the sources which have the greatest coverage of the countries in our
sample—in general, we prefer sources with the maximum cross-country coverage and lowest amount of
ambiguity in values (i.e. a single value as far as possible instead of a range, or a minimum bound). More
often than not, we use data from Almeida et al. (2006) for the 1980s and 1990s, and Crowe et al. (2011) for
the 2000s.
2.2 Foreclosure rules and bankruptcy provisions
While we expect foreclosure rules and bankruptcy provisions to vary considerably across the countries
in the sample, it is a challenge to come up with easily quantifiable variables representing these rules and
provisions due to their inherent complexity and idiosyncratic features. Instead, we have chosen to report
data (which were more readily available and quantifiable), on the efficiency of the foreclosure process. In
particular, we refer to the typical duration of a foreclosure procedure, measured in months.
There is considerable variation in this variable across the countries in our sample. Overall, we believe
that this is a reasonable proxy for the relative flexibility and efficiency of the foreclosure and bankruptcy
provisions, and the institutions enforcing them. We expect that a more inefficient procedure for foreclo-
sure or bankruptcy (longer duration or higher cost), is likely to be correlated with the relative ease and
flexibility with which this can be done in a given country, in practice. We report the corresponding data
in Table 3.
2.3 Prepayment penalties
The relative attractiveness of FRMs over ARMs is partially a function of the inherent call-option value of
an FRM. This represents a benefit to borrowers, and a cost to lenders. Lenders often attempt to recover
this by charging prepayment penalties. If a complete yield maintenance penalty is charged, this effectively
reduces the option value of FRMs to zero. However, for the purposes of consumer protection, regulators
in several countries mandate statutory limits on the type and amount of prepayment penalties that lenders
are permitted to charge. A reasonable approximation is that stronger consumer protection generally leads
to lower prepayment penalties, and greater FRM option value.
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However, quantifying prepayment penalties, and limits on them has proven to be difficult. First,
prepayment penalties are often built into each individual contract with terms linked to other specific
details of the contract, for example loan maturity or amortization schedule. This severely complicates
the computation of a single aggregate measure for each country. This problem is compounded by the
presence of significant variation in prepayment penalties across lenders as well as loan varieties within a
given country.
Second, regulations on the charging of prepayment penalties are often vague, and not amenable to
quantification. For example in Germany, the regulation consists of a formula to be used in computing the
lost interest income for the lender (European Commission, 2009).
Third, both the regulations regarding the levying of prepayment penalties, and the typical prepayment
penalties themselves, are specified in different units in different countries. Regulations can be of the form
of (1) a volume limit on the number of interest payments that can be charged as penalty, the percentage of
the loan, or the percentage of the amount prepaid that can be charged as a penalty, or (2) the stipulation
of certain qualitative conditions under which penalty cannot be charged (e.g. death or financial hardship).
Some countries also mandate a certain threshold period (e.g. first 10 years), or a certain percentage of the
loan value per year, up to which penalty-free prepayment can be made. Accordingly, influenced by reg-
ulation, the prepayment penalties themselves are stated in different terms across countries (e.g. referring
to yield maintenance, the specified number of interest payments, percentage of loan value, percentage of
value prepaid, as well as stipulations for penalty-free prepayment).
The prepayment penalty system in a country is often a composite of several of the above-mentioned
features. This further complicates our attempt to obtain a single, quantifiable measure of the extent of
prepayment penalties, as well as any limits on prepayment penalties that exist in a given country.
In spite of these difficulties and the general lack of availability of country-level data on prepayment
penalties, we propose a synthesis of the available information below. Overall, the information on prepay-
ment penalties and regulations on prepayment penalties gathered from a large and varied set of sources
appears to be largely consistent. This may be an indication of the reliability of the information, despite
the considerable heterogeneity of product characteristics.
The broad summary of prepayment penalties and regulations is presented in Table 4.
In Table 5 we classify the idiosyncratic prepayment penalties and regulations in each country, and
group them under a few broad categories. In these tables, the heading "Unclear” refers to the fact that
a clear-cut classification to FRMs, ARMs, or both is not apparent in the information contained in the
secondary sources that we analyzed.
In Table 6, we report estimated prepayment option premia. According to Lea and Sanders (2010), a
harsher prepayment penalty system (i.e. higher penalties, with the highest being full yield maintenance)
is one in which the prepayment risk is borne by the individuals who decide to prepay, rather than paid by
all mortgage holders via higher interest rates. They also infer that harsher prepayment penalties should
be associated with smaller prepayment option premia—leading them to believe that prepayment option
premia may be reasonable proxies for how harsh the prepayment penalty system is.
3 Supply-side factors
The variables in this section capture elements of the supply-side variation in mortgage markets across the
countries in our sample, and over time (where possible). The variables in this section concern the financing
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of mortgages, namely the extent to which mortgages in various countries are financed via securitization,
specifically mortgage backed securities (MBS), or covered bonds.
First, in Tables 7 and 8 we report the volume of issuance of covered bonds and MBS respectively. Then,
in Tables 9 and 10, we divide these numbers by total mortgage lending volume to obtain the the covered
bond issuance ratio, and the securitization ratio, which measure the share of new lending financed by
MBS and covered bonds respectively in each year.
Our data on issuance of covered bonds and MBS is obtained from a different source than data on
lending volumes. Issues with currency conversion at the data sources may also contribute to inconsis-
tencies, as data from the ECBC and EMF is all reported in Euros or ECUs, whereas the lending volume
was converted manually to Euros. Furthermore, for the majority of European countries, issuance data
on MBS and covered bonds is obtained through the EMF and the ECBC, whose datasets are incomplete
and contain major omissions. Further work will be required to fill these gaps, and obtain better data for
the remaining countries (e.g. covered bonds and MBS issuance, as well as lending volumes), such as to
yield a complete set of logically consistent securitization and covered bond issuance ratios. For now,
we deal with measurement inconsistencies for some of the countries in the sample, which yield logically
implausible values for the securitization and covered bonds issuance ratios, by simply reporting issuance
volumes. Cells marked with a hyphen (-) indicate logically inconsistent values, and cells which are blank
indicate missing data.
Securitization rates for the US can be obtained from Inside Mortgage Finance, which provides direct
calculations of ratio of securitization volumes and lending values. However, similar sources seem not to
be available for the other countries in our sample.
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Table 1
Summary of variables and data availability
This table contains a summary of the availability of data on the variables of interest, for the countries in the sample. The countries are ordered in descending
order of number of variables for which data is available for the given country. Green cells indicate that data is available, and red cells indicate data is unavailable.
Under the column "LTV”, we indicate whether the value for maximum LTV ratio (either mandated if a statutory limit exists, or maximum observed value if no
such limit exists) is available, for each country. Under "Bankruptcy”, we consider whether the data on typical duration of foreclosure procedure is available.
Under "Prepayment Penalty”, we consider whether data on the institutional features of prepayment penalties are available, and whether the prepayment option
premium value is available. Under the "Issuance” columns, we record whether the volume of issuance is available, and whether the annual time-series is complete
for 2003-2012, and 2008-2012. Under the "Share” columns, we report for each country, whether a logically consistent (less than or equal to 100%) value is given,
alongside a complete annual time-series from 2008-2012 (in the case of covered bonds) and 2009-2012 (in the case of RMBS).
Country LTV Maximum Bankruptcy Prepayment Penalty CB Issuance RMBS Issuance CB Share RMBS Share
1980 1990 2000 Foreclosure
duration
Institutional
features
Option
premium
Start End Complete
2003-12
Complete
2008-12
Start End Complete
2003-12
Complete
2009-12
Start End Complete
2008-12
Start End Complete
2009-12
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1991 2012 1 1 2002 2010 0 0 2003 2012 1 2003 2006 0
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1991 2012 0 1 1999 2012 1 1 2005 2011 0 2003 2011 0
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1991 2012 0 1 1996 2012 0 1 2005 2012 1 2009 2012 0
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1991 2012 1 1 1993 2012 0 1 2003 2010 0 2009 2012 1
UK 1 1 1 0 1 1 2003 2012 1 1 1991 2012 0 1 2003 2012 1 2002 2012 1
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 0 2012 2012 0 0 1997 2012 0 1 2012 2012 0 2003 2012 1
Denmark 1 1 1 0 1 1 1991 2012 1 1 2005 2005 0 0 - - 0 2005 2005 0
Finland 1 1 1 1 1 0 1991 2012 0 1 1999 2004 0 0 2005 2012 1 - - 0
Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 0 2004 2012 0 1 1996 2012 0 0 2004 2012 1 2003 2012 0
Portugal 0 0 1 1 1 1 1996 2012 0 1 2009 2012 0 1 2006 2009 0 2009 2012 1
US 1 1 1 0 1 1 2006 2007 0 0 1999 2012 1 1 2006 2007 0 0 0 0
Sweden 1 1 1 0 1 0 1991 2012 0 1 2001 2004 0 0 2006 2007 0 2001 2004 0
Australia 1 1 1 0 0 0 2011 2012 0 0 - - 0 0 - - 0 - - 0
Greece 0 0 0 1 1 0 2008 2011 0 0 2003 2012 0 0 2008 2009 0 2003 2009 0
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Table 2
Maximum LTV ratios
This table reports the maximum allowable Loan-to-value (LTV) ratio where such a limit is statutory. In some countries
there is no statutory maximum LTV ratio. In such cases we report in place of the maximum LTV ratio, the maximum
observed average LTV ratio in the decade. Values above 100% LTV were observed in the UK and Netherlands prior to
the crisis of 2008. Only recently, in 2012, has a limitation of 100% been discussed in the Netherlands1. Blanks indicate
unavailable data.
Max Max
1981-1990 1991-2000 2000-2007
Australia 80 80 95
Belgium 75 80 100
Denmark 95 80 80
Greece
Ireland 90 80 100
Italy 56 60 80
Netherlands 75 75 125
Sweden 95 75 100
United States 89 80 100
Finland 85 80 100
Germany 65 80 80
Portugal 90
Spain 80 80 100
UK 87 95 110
Sources: Almeida et al. (2006) pp. 10 Crowe et al. (2011) pp. 46
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Table 3
Efficiency of foreclosure procedures
The duration of foreclosure procedures (in months) refers to the average duration taken for the completion of the
foreclosure procedure including completion of court proceedings, sale of the asset, and distribution of proceeds to the
creditors (National Bank of Belgium, 2013). Other variables referring to the bankruptcy proceedings are omitted due
to questionable reliability, and lack of consistency with other sources. Blanks indicate unavailable data.
Typical duration of a
foreclosure procedure (in
months)
Australia
Belgium 19
Denmark
Greece 24
Ireland 19
Italy 56
Netherlands 5
Sweden
United States
Finland 4
Germany 9
Portugal 24
Spain 8
UK
Sources: National Bank of Belgium (2013) pp. 49
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Table 4
Overview of prepayment penalties
This table gives a summary of the cross-country variation in the existence of prepayment penalties (and where available, whether they apply to FRMs or
ARMs). Under "Existence of penalty" we note whether prepayment penalties exist, and in the case where ’0’ is indicated, this refers to the fact that either it is
forbidden to collect prepayment penalties by statute, or it is common practice in the market to not charge prepayment penalties. Where available, we specify
the form and type of prepayment penalty charged, and the conditions under which penalty-free early repayment can be made. ’1’ and ’0’ are dummy variables
denoting presence and absence of a given item. Finally, under "Limits on penalty", we denote whether there exist either statutory limits for the purpose of
consumer protection, or common market practices, that limit the extent of prepayment penalties that can be charged. Volume limit refers to a restriction that
prepayment penalty cannot exceed a certain volume, either percentage of outstanding balance, or percentage of amount prepaid, or certain number of monthly
payments. Blank spaces indicate unavailable data. The term "Unclear” codifies the fact that it is unclear whether this item applies to FRM, ARM or both.
Existence of penalty Type of penalty2 Conditions for penalty free prepayment3 Limits on penalty
FRM ARM Unclear FRM ARM Unclear FRM ARM Unclear FRM ARM Unclear
Australia 1 Yield maintenance
Belgium 1 Death Volume limit
Denmark4 1 for non
callable;
0 for
callable
Yield maintenance
for non callable;
None for callable
Implicit for non
callable
None for non callable
Greece 1 Volume limit
Ireland 1 0
Italy 1 1 1-2% of prepaid
value
1-2% of prepaid
value
Informal cap of 5% Informal cap of 5% Yield maintenance
prohibited
Netherlands 1 Yield Maintenance Hardship,
relocation,
10% per year
penalty free
10% per year penalty free
Sweden 1
United States 0 1 Usually less than
5%, approx 3%
20% per
year
penalty
free
Finland 1 1 Yield maintenance 0 None
Germany 1 0 Yield maintenance If property sold,
relocation, if
lender refuses
request to increase
mortgage
Only in first 10 years can
fees be charged,
10% per year penalty free
Portugal 1 2% 25% per
year
pnealty-free
Spain 1 1 2.5-5% of residual
balance
0.5% of residual
balance
10% per year free 10% per
year free
cap of 4%, informal cap
2.5%
cap of 1%
UK 1 1 2-5% of prepaid
value
No definite limit, case by
case
Sources: Lea (2010), Schafer (2006) pp. 5-7, Mercer Oliver Wyman (2003) pp. 42, European Commission (2009) pp. 204-211, O’Reilly (2000) pp. 21
9
Table 5
Institutional features of regulations on prepayment penalties
In this table, we classify the institutional features of consumer protection regulations on prepayment penalties, including their existence, and type. ’1’ and ’0’ are
dummy variables denoting presence and absence of a given item. Blank spaces indicate unavailable data. "Unclear"’ codifies the fact that it is unclear whether
this item applies to FRM, ARM or both. The first two columns denote the existence of statutes (or commonly agreed market practices) that limit the volume
of prepayment penalty that can be charged, either as a percentage of outstanding balance, or a specific number of monthly payments. The next three columns
give details on the circumstances under which penalty free prepayment can be made (once again, either mandated or by common practice), including exigent
circumstances like death and unemployment, or the lapse of a certain time period (for instance, charging penalties may be forbidden when a loan gets closer to
maturity), or whether there is a certain percentage of balance that can be repaid early, penalty-free. The final column indicates whether there exists a prescribed
definition of the nature of loss against which lenders can claim a prepayment penalty (for instance, as in Germany for FRMs and in other countries, where
prepayment penalties can only be charged in order to compensate for lost interest income).
Upper limit on prepayment charges Conditions for penalty-free prepayment Definition of the loss for
which fee is charged, and
calculation of the charge
% of outstanding balance Specific number of
monthly payments
Death, unemployment,
relocation, excessive
interest
Lapse of certain time
period
Up to certain % of
mortgage value
FRM ARM Unclear FRM ARM Unclear FRM ARM Unclear FRM ARM Unclear FRM ARM Unclear FRM ARM Unclear
Australia
Belgium 1 1
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0
Greece 1 1 1 1
Ireland 1 1 1 1
Italy 1 1
Netherlands 0 1 1 1 1
Sweden 1
United States 0 0 1
Finland 1
Germany 1 1 1
Portugal 1 1 1
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1
UK 0 0 0 0
Sources: Lea (2010) pp. 21-23, Scahfer (2006) pp. 5-7, European Commission (2009) pp. 204-211
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Table 6
Prepayment option premia
This table reports estimated counterfactual mortgage rates which are free of prepayment risk, as well as the corre-
sponding prepayment option premium. Harsher prepayment penalties are correlated with lower prepayment option
premia, since in those cases the prepayment risk can be individualized and not reflected in higher overall rates. Only
when lenders cannot reclaim their losses by charging penalties from borrowers, due to existence of strong regulations
or market practices in favour of consumer protection, do we expect the option premium to be large, and have a
positive impact on mortgage rates.
Average
interest rate
with
prepayment
risk
Prepayment
option
premium
Average
interest rate
without
prepayment
risk
Price increase
due to
prepayment
option
Australia
Belgium
Denmark 5.19% 0.46% 4.73% 10%
Greece
Ireland
Italy 4.73% 0.2% 4.53% 4%
Netherlands 4.55% 0.2% 4.35% 5%
Sweden
United States 0.5%
Finland
Germany 4.84% 0.06% 4.78% 1%
Portugal 3.58% 0% 3.58% 0%
Spain 3.55% 0% 3.55% 0%
UK 4.88% 0.01% 4.87% 0%
Source: Dubel (2005) pp. 27, US from Lea and Sanders (2011) pp. 228
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Table 7
Issuance of mortgage covered bonds (in EUR millions)
Blanks refer to unavailable data, hyphens refer to unreliable data which require further investigation.
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Australia 2142 34902
Belgium 2590
Denmark 11918 11704 30924 37656 20535 30983 33926 56546 53122 36618 69844 76063 99727 95009 149708 114014 70955 103230 125484 148475 145147 185845
Greece 5000 1500 17250 5000
Ireland 2000 2000 7753 1675 9506 14801 6000 9290 5500
Italy 20946 16083 23126 21743 4000 4063 6500 7500 12925 29261 70768
Netherlands 197 159 301 298 286 626 296 341 - - 2000 6732 7873 5608 7725 13710 14163 10738
Sweden 16885 19982 24783 23868 15668 18444 24027 26107 235545 22192 23652 25590 17569 36638 43488 53106 79910 69800 48936
United States - -
Finland 810 251 169 262 125 253 349 177 250 1250 1500 1500 1250 2125 5250 9964 9368
Germany 12679 21904 35300 38168 38255 36311 41596 50000 46575 49553 44013 40857 57621 40773 33722 35335 26834 57345 56852 42216 40911 38540
Portugal - - 2000 5850 7020 7250 11870 9300 4850
Spain 1954 1433 2350 1940 2881 2061 2194 1472 5235 2530 28502 37835 57780 69890 51801 54187 43580 51916 72077 98846
UK 5000 10688 12675 25813 31673 120906 33870 25900 36983 37109
Source: ECBC (2013)
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Table 8
Issuance of mortgage-backed securities (in EUR millions)
Blanks refer to unavailable data, hyphens refer to unreliable data which require further investigation.
Issued MBS 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Australia
Belgium - - - 2270 1050 19100 11400 19000 4700
Denmark -
Greece 250 741 1500 3600 2805 1400 1700 1300
Ireland 254 508 1150 1645 2014 1820 2000 2000 7900 1675 9500 13700 4200 900
Italy 275 1510 8085 6578 8871 7417 9850 16946 22267 75735 53200 10000 8800 31700
Netherlands 229 1380 914 3837 7406 9171 17611 40800 125000 83400 34200
Sweden 280 1470 1000 1513
United States 722774 576170 1379448 1787578 2186913 1161748 1373933 1282695 1239326 817313 1249954 1080138 891802 1346673
Finland 177 500
Germany - - - - - - -
Portugal 8700 9400 1300 1600
Spain 232 519 686 108 702 3871 5932 3059 4230 11470 15910 26300 17800 14100 2500
UK 3279 522 1347 2963 2906 3334 8245 22650 25470 35270 55460 79773 103311 202823 62300 87900 77900 38700
Source: ECBC (2013), EMF (2012), SIFMA (2014)
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Table 9
Mortgage covered bond issuance as a share of total mortgage lending volume
Blanks refer to unavailable data, hyphens refer to unreliable data which require further investigation.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Australia
Belgium 0.094
Denmark - - - - - - - - - -
Greece 0.402 0.188 -
Ireland 0.074 0.047 0.129 0.0265 0.235 0.490 0.251 0.597 0.511
Italy 0.064 0.060 0.108 0.138 0.222 0.551 -
Netherlands 0.019 0.063 0.010 0.077 0.146 0.216 0.193 0.197
Sweden 0.497 0.974 - - - - -
United States - -
Finland 0.048 0.056 0.052 0.047 0.108 0.250 0.442 0.432
Germany 0.328 0.262 0.197 0.188 0.148 0.325 0.291 0.228 0.213 0.200
Portugal 0.109 0.298 0.525 0.777 - - -
Spain 0.276 0.309 0.374 0.410 0.356 0.622 0.596 0.747 - -
UK 0.0125 0.025 0.030 0.051 0.060 0.379 0.210 0.164 0.227 0.210
Table 10
Mortgage backed securities issuance as a share of total mortgage lending volume
Blanks refer to unavailable data, hyphens refer to unreliable data which require further investigation.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Australia
Belgium 0.122 0.067 0.912 0.398 0.690 0.171
Denmark 0.001
Greece 0.042 0.092 0.110 0.233 0.185 0.176
Ireland 0.054 0.074 0.047 0.131 0.026 0.235 0.455 0.174 0.084
Italy 0.201 0.142 0.158 0.250 0.320 - 0.978 0.171 0.164 -
Netherlands 0.768 - - 0.627
Sweden 0.016 0.078 0.0423 0.055
United States - - - - - - - - - - - -
Finland
Germany - - - -
Portugal 0.932 0.930 0.268 0.569
Spain 0.154 0.360 0.257 0.376 0.077
UK 0.100 0.138 0.186 0.245 0.400 0.437 0.557 0.479 0.219
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Notes
1For details, see "Mortgage Markets in the Netherlands" ABN AMRO, May 2012, and Netherlands Financial System Stability
Assessment, IMF, May 2011.
2Yield Maintenance refers to the idea that a prepayment penalty is charged in order to compensate the lender fully for the lost of
yield due to refinancing at a lower rate, rendering the same yield as if the borrower made all scheduled mortgage payments until
maturity at the original rate.
3Penalty free payments may be permitted, either by law or by common understanding amongst lenders under certain conditions.
These conditions include, but are not limited to, death, hardship, relocation, sale of property, or a certain percentage of balance that
can be prepaid for free every year.
4In the Danish mortgage market, each mortgage is financed by a mortgage bond linked specifically to it. These bonds are of two
types, callable and non-callable. Callable bonds are enabling the borrowers to prepay their loan at par at each payment date during
the duration of the loan, by purchasing and delivering the bond to the lender. The non-callable bond is similar to fixed-rate mortgage
bonds in most European countries, and do not carry an embedded call option. As a result, prepayment penalties are charged that
allow investors to attain the same yield as if the borrower made all scheduled mortgage payments until maturity, otherwise known
as yield maintenance ("Danish Mortgage Bonds", Realkredit Danmark, September 2008). There are no limits on the penalty that can
be charged for non-callable bonds.
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